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Abstract
Side channel attacks are a major security concern for 
smart cards and other embedded devices. They analyze 
the variations on the power consumption to find the secret 
key of the encryption algorithm implemented within the 
security IC. To address this issue, logic gates that have a 
constant power dissipation independent of the input 
signals, are used in security ICs. This paper presents a 
design methodology to create fully connected differential 
pull down networks. Fully connected differential pull 
down networks are transistor networks that for any 
complementary input combination connect all the internal 
nodes of the network to one of the external nodes of the 
network. They are memoryless and for that reason have a 
constant load capacitance and power consumption. This 
type of networks is used in specialized logic gates to 
guarantee a constant contribution of the internal nodes 
into the total power consumption of the logic gate. 
1 Introduction 
Encryption algorithms are designed to be secure 
against cryptanalysis that has access to plaintext and 
ciphertext. The physical implementation however, 
provides the attacker with important information. 
Numerous attacks have been presented that use ‘side-
channels’, such as the time delay and the power 
consumption of the encryption operation, as an extra 
source of information to find the secret key [1]. These so-
called side-channel attacks threaten any device of which 
the integrated circuit is easily observable such as smart 
cards and embedded devices. The differential power 
analysis [2] in particular is of great concern. It is very 
effective in finding the secret key and can be mounted 
quickly with off-the-shelf devices. The attack is based on 
the fact that logic operations have power characteristics 
that depend on the input data. It relies on statistical 
analysis to extract the information from the power 
consumption that is correlated to the secret key. 
All embedded applications, such as for example PDAs, 
cellphones, smart cards and sensor nodes in an ambient 
intelligent environment need to communicate with their 
environment. Therefore, they will need cryptographic 
capabilities for authentication and confidentiality. Some 
efforts have recently been made during special sessions at 
premier design conferences to raise the awareness for the 
danger that side-channel attacks pose to all embedded 
devices [3],[4].  
At first, the differential power analysis attack has been 
fought with ad hoc countermeasures. For instance, the 
addition of random power consuming operations or a 
current sink obscured the data dependent variations in the 
power consumption. These techniques do not solve the 
problem; they only increase the number of measurements 
for a DPA attack. Subsequently, countermeasures have 
been conceived at different abstraction levels of the 
security application. One illustration at the algorithmic 
level is masking [5]. This technique prevents that 
intermediate variables depend on an easily accessible 
subset of the secret key.
However, the best solution is to try not to create any 
side channel information. This can be done at the logic 
level with specialized circuit techniques [6],[7] The goal 
of these countermeasures is to make the power 
consumption of the individual logic gates independent of 
their input signals or the Hamming distances between 
subsequent input signals. When the power consumption of 
the smallest building block is a constant and independent 
of the signal activity, no information is leaked through the 
power supply and power attacks are impossible.  
The circuit techniques can be categorized in two 
groups. One group uses gates composed of standard logic 
gates [8],[9], the other group uses custom made gates 
[10],[11],[12]. Custom made gates offer a higher security 
because the designer has full control over the internal 
organization of the cells. Yet, there is a tradeoff with the 
costs of developing a custom designed library. In dynamic 
current mode logic (DyCML) [13], proposed in [11], the 
transistor sizes even depend on the final layout of the 
interconnect wiring after place & route as they are based 
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on the output capacitance. DyCML also requires a 
complex clock delay network as gates at different logic 
depth need different clock delays. Major disadvantages of 
the logic style proposed in [12] are the limited library –
only the AND-NAND gate–, the large transistor count –
112 transistors for the AND-NAND gate– and the 
asynchronous design approach, which still lags behind that 
of synchronous designs.  
For sense amplifier based logic (SABL), our previous 
work proposed in [10], only gates with two or fewer 
inputs have been presented. The logic style requires a 
special structure of the differential pull down network 
(DPDN) to control the contribution of the internal nodes 
into the power consumption. The main requirement is that 
the network must be fully connected. This means that for 
any complementary input combination all the internal 
nodes of the network connect to one of the external nodes 
of the network. As a result, all the internal nodes go 
through a discharge-charge cycle and have a constant 
power dissipation. The main contribution of this paper is a 
systematic design method to generate fully connected 
differential pull down networks for an arbitrary logic 
function.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. 
The next section enumerates the characteristics of constant 
power dissipating logic. Section 3 discusses the fully 
connected differential pull down network in detail. In 
section 4, design methods are formulated to create fully 
connected differential pull down networks given a 
Boolean expression or given an existing differential pull 
down network. The design example implements a complex 
fully connected differential pull down network. Section 5 
describes an enhancement to avoid early propagation. 
Finally, a conclusion will be formulated. 
2 Constant Power Dissipating Logic 
The power dissipation of traditional logic depends on 
the signal activity. When the output of the logic gate 
makes a 0 to 1 transition, a current comes from the supply 
and charges the output capacitance. On the other hand, 
when the output sees a 1 to 0 transition or no transition at 
all, no energy is consumed from the power supply. Two 
conditions must be satisfied to have constant power 
dissipating logic: (1) a logic gate must have exactly one 
charging event per clock cycle; and (2) the logic gate must 
charge a constant capacitance in that charging event. 
Dynamic and differential logic fulfills the first 
condition. In a differential logic family, a signal is 
represented by both the true and the false value. A 
dynamic logic family alternates precharge and evaluation 
phases. In the precharge phase, the output is pre-charged 
to 1, and in the evaluation phase the output is 
conditionally evaluated to 0. For the combination of 
dynamic and differential logic this means that exactly one 
of the two outputs will evaluate to 0 as the output must be 
differential during the evaluation phase. During the 
subsequent precharge phase, the discharged output will be 
pre-charged to 1. In other words, every signal transition, 
including the events in which the input signals remain 
constant, is represented with an actual switching event, in 
which the logic gate charges a capacitance. All the logic 
families that have been introduced to thwart the DPA 
[7],[8],[9],[10],[11],[12] employ some form of dynamic 
differential logic.  
Besides a 100% switching factor, it is essential in order 
to achieve constant power consumption that a fixed 
amount of charge is used per transition. Differential logic 
has a load capacitance at each output. Since only one 
output undergoes a transition per switching event, the total 
load at the true output should match the total load at the 
false output. This means that the load capacitances at the 
differential output should be matched. The load 
capacitance has three components: the intrinsic output 
capacitance of the gate, the interconnect capacitance and 
the intrinsic input capacitance of the load. Intrinsic 
capacitances are parasitic node capacitances of the logic 
gate.  
(Dis)charging parasitic capacitances, which are 
internal to the gate itself, have an influence on the power 
consumption as well. Simulations indicate that e.g. for the 
AND-NAND gate in cascode voltage switch logic (CVSL) 
[14], the variation on the power consumption can be as 
large as 50% [10]. This is caused by asymmetry in the 
gate. Depending on the input, different parasitic 
capacitances that are internal to the differential pull down 
network discharge during the evaluation phase. In the 
succeeding power consuming precharge phase, these 
capacitances are recharged. This phenomenon is also 
referred to as memory effect.  
Sense amplifier based logic [10] uses advanced circuit 
techniques to guarantee that the load capacitance has a 
constant value. The logic style completely controls the 
portion of the load capacitance that is due to the logic 
gate. The intrinsic capacitances at the differential in- and 
output signals are symmetric. Additionally, the special 
structure of the differential pull down network guarantees 
that all the internal nodes go through a discharge-charge 
cycle and no nodes are left floating. As a result it 
discharges and charges each of the internal nodes in every 
cycle together with one of the balanced output 
capacitances. Hence, it discharges and charges a constant 
capacitance value.
The generic sense amplifier based logic gate is shown 
in Fig. 1. The gate consists of the sense amplifier of the 
StrongArm110 flip-flop [15] of which the input 
differential pair is exchanged by a differential pull down 
network. In the precharge phase, both the true and the 
false value of all input signals are set at 0. The true and the 
false output signal are precharged to 1. During the 
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evaluation phase, the input becomes complementary and 
the network connects one of the network output nodes, X 
or Y, to the common node Z. This will make the logic gate 
switch and one gate output will discharge to 0. Note that 
whichever branch of the differential pull down network is 
on, X and Y are connected through transistor M1 and both 
nodes will eventually be discharged. This leaves the gate 
in a stable state until the next precharge phase.  
VDD 
clk
clk 
in1 in1
OUT OUT
in2
inm
in2
inm
DPDN 
clk 
M1X Y 
Z
Fig. 1. Generic sense amplifier based logic gate. 
3 Fully Connected DPDN 
A fully connected differential pull down network is 
designed such that for any complementary input 
combination all internal nodes of the network are 
connected to one of the module output nodes X or Y. As a 
result, since both nodes X and Y eventually discharge, all 
the internal nodes are discharged during the evaluation 
phase and will be charged during the next precharge 
phase. The requirement of fully connected differential pull 
down networks in constant power dissipating logic is in 
contrast with genuine logic, where the design constraints 
are to minimize the device count and the number of 
stacked levels [16].
As an example, Fig. 2 (left) and (right) show the 
implementation of the AND-NAND function with a 
genuine and with a fully connected differential pull down 
network respectively. The genuine network has one 
internal node, node W. This node can become floating for 
some input combinations. For example when both A and 
B remain at 0 during the transition from the precharge 
phase to the evaluation phase (and A  and B  both switch 
from 0 to 1), node W is disconnected from node X as well 
as from node Z. There is no path for the charge to flow 
away and node W keeps it charge on the parasitic 
capacitance. On the other hand, when both A and B switch 
from 0 to 1 ( A  and B  both remain at 0), node W is 
connected to node Z and the parasitic capacitance 
discharges. The difference in power dissipation between 
both input events will come from the fact that for the latter 
event, the capacitance at node W will need to be charged 
in the subsequent precharge phase.  
A+B 
B B
A
A
YX
Z
A.B
M2
W
B B
A A
YX
Z
A.B A.B+B
M2
W
Fig. 2. Implementation of AND-NAND function with 
genuine DPDN (left); and fully connected DPDN (right). 
For a genuine differential pull down network several 
discharge events with different combinations of parasitic 
capacitances exist. This means that the total load 
capacitance, and thus the power consumption, is signal 
dependent. It is impossible to match the total load 
capacitance of the different discharge events by 
manipulating transistor sizes and/or layouts. The 
contribution of the internal node capacitances can only be 
controlled by making sure that they all discharge 
independently of the input event. Repositioning transistor 
M2, which is located between nodes Y and Z and is driven 
by input A , between nodes Y and W achieves this effect. 
This operation does not alter the functionality of the 
individual branches of the differential pull down network 
( B.AB.A   and BB.ABA   ) but it guarantees that 
for any complementary input combination, node W is 
connected to one of the module output nodes. Hence, 
independently of the input event in the evaluation phase, 
node W will be discharged. 
Fig. 3 shows two transient SPICE simulations of a 
discharging event in the evaluation phase followed by a 
charging event in the precharge phase of the sense 
amplifier based logic AND-NAND gate for two different 
inputs. The figure shows that the instantaneous output 
voltages and the supply current are independent of the 
input event applied to the gate. Fig. 4 demonstrates that 
for both events all the internal node capacitances and one 
of the balanced output nodes are discharged. In each 
event, the same amount of charge is needed to charge the 
same capacitances, and hence the same amount of energy, 
is used. 
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Fig. 3. Output signals and supply current of SABL 
AND-NAND gate: transient simulation for (0,1)-input 
(top); and (1,1)-input (bottom). Note that in the 
precharge phase all inputs (A, A , B, B ) are at 0 and 
that subsequently in the evaluation phase either A or 
A  and either B or B  become 1. 
ANDNAND
Ctot=19.32fF 
ANDNAND 
Ctot=19.38fF
Fig. 4. Discharge event of SABL AND-NAND gate in the 
evaluation phase for (0,1)-input (left); and (1,1)-input 
(right).
4 Designing fully connected DPDNs 
This section formulates a design method to create a 
fully connected differential pull down network for a 
logical function f  given either a Boolean expression or 
an existing differential pull down network.  
4.1 Given a Boolean expression  
The design procedure to create a fully connected 
differential pull down network for a logical function f
consists of five steps.  
Step 0: Create the Boolean expression of the logical 
function f . The complementary output will be referred to 
as f .
Step 1: Identify 2 expressions x  and y  that combine 
to the logical function f . The result is either an AND-
operation ( yxf . ) or an OR-operation, ( yxf  ).
Step 2: Complement the expression of f in x  and y
to get the dual expression f . The result is an OR-
operation ( yxf  ) or an AND-operation, ( yxf . ).
The results of the previous 2 steps are two dual 
expressions: 
either case A)  or case B)
yxf . yxf  
yxf  yxf . 
Step 3: Transform the OR-operation.  
The Boolean expression is translated to a differential 
PDN in the traditional way. An AND operation is 
represented by a series of switches, an OR operation by a 
parallel connection of switches [17]. At this abstraction 
level, only the series combination has an internal node. 
In case A), we transform the parallel connection into 
yyx . , put network y  at the bottom of the yx.
connection and share network y  between the two 
branches yx.  and yyx . .
In case B) we transform the parallel connection 
into yyx . , put network y  at the bottom of the yx.
connection and share network y  between the two 
branches yx.  and yyx . .
Step 4: Decompose and repeat the procedure for the 
logical expressions x  and y  until the network consists of 
only 1 literal, which corresponds to a single transistor.
Step 5: Substitute the results. 
4.2 Given an existing DPDN 
The above design method can also be implemented 
directly on a differential pull down network. For a given 
schematic of a genuine differential pull down network, the 
design procedure is a transformation. The transformation 
repositions transistors in the genuine network in three 
steps. The total number of devices remains the same 
between the genuine and the fully connected network. The 
evaluation depth, which is defined by the maximum 
number of devices in series, may increase.   
¯
®
­
¯
®
­
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Step 1: Identify all the networks in series.  
Step 2a: Open the corresponding dual parallel 
networks. Each parallel network is opened at the bottom 
of the component that corresponds with the dual 
component that is at the top of the series network.  
Step 2b: Connect the opened parallel connections to 
the internal nodes of the corresponding series connections.  
Step 3: Unroll the network.  
4.3 Design example  
Fig. 5 illustrates both design procedures. The design 
example consists of a complex differential pull down 
network used in an OAI22 logic gate (or-and-invert with 2 
and 2 inputs). Both design methods produce a network 
that is fully connected.
In the resulting differential pull down network, both 
the true and the false of an input signal control a device 
for every internal node. Consequently independent of the 
complementary input in the evaluation phase, every 
internal node is connected to another node. This is either 
an external node or another internal node, for which both 
the true and the false of an input signal control a device. 
As a result independent of the input, every internal node is 
connected to an external node and the network is fully 
connected.
5 Enhanced fully connected DPDN 
The fully connected differential pull down network can 
be further enhanced to have an evaluation depth that is 
independent of the discharge events. The evaluation depth 
is defined as the number of transistors in series between 
the nodes X or Y to the common ground node Z. A pass-
gate is inserted if different discharge paths do not have the 
same number of transistors. We insert a pass-gate for all 
the input signals that do not control a transistor in that 
particular discharge path. A pass-gate, which is built by a 
parallel combination of two transistors driven by both the 
signal and its complement, is always open for a 
complementary input. The enhanced fully connected 
differential pull down network implementing the AND-
NAND function is shown in Fig. 6. The trade-off is an 
increase in area and total load capacitance.
The introduction of the dummy transistors has two 
desired effects. First, since the evaluation depth is 
independent of the discharge event, there is now a 
constant resistance in the discharge path between outputs 
X or Y and the common node Z. As a result, each gate has 
a constant delay as now both the resistance and the 
capacitance are independent of the inputs. Second, early 
evaluation has been eliminated. No evaluation will start 
before all inputs are stable and complementary. As a 
result, since the logic gate can not produce any anticipated 
results, the delay of a combination of gates is a constant as 
each gate evaluates when the input-pair with the longest 
1 2 3 
A
C D
B CA
B D
(A+B).(C+D) A.B+C.D 
I) identify the connections in series 
A
C D
B CA
B D
II) open the corresponding parallel 
connections and connect them      
to the series connections 
B
A
B
A
C C
D D
(A.B+B).(C.D+D) A.B.(C.D+D)+C.D
III) unroll the network 
1
2
3
D)B).(C(Ax0   oidentify 11.yx  ocomplement 11 yx 
transform 
111 yyx 
BAx1   o
identify BA   ocomplement B.A BBA.x1  
transform  
BBA.  B.Ax1  
DCy1   oidentify DC   ocomplement D.C DDC.y1  D)DB).(C.B(A.x0  
transform   
DDC.  D.Cy1  D.CD)D(C.B.Ax0  
Fig. 5. Transformation of a complex DPDN to a fully connected DPDN: design example. 
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delay has switched from the 0-0 precharge state to a 
complementary input. 
B B
A A
YX
Z
A
dummy 
transistors
A.B A.B+(A+A)B
B B
A A
YX
Z
A.B A.B+B 
M2
W
Fig. 6. Implementation of AND-NAND function with 
fully connected DPDN (left); and enhanced fully 
connected DPDN (right). 
6 Conclusions 
We have illustrated that fully connected differential 
pull down networks, which are differential transistor 
networks for which all internal nodes connect to an output 
node when a complementary input is applied, are 
necessary to avoid memory effects and to guarantee a 
constant contribution of the internal nodes into the power 
consumption of a logic gate. We have presented a design 
methodology to create fully connected networks. They can 
be constructed from a given Boolean expression or from a 
given genuine differential pull down network. Pass gates 
can be inserted to enhance the fully connected network. 
The dummy devices ensure a network evaluation depth 
that is independent of the input signals and eliminate early 
propagation effects. 
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